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Abstract. Fiscal foresight—the phenomenon that legislative and implementation lags en-
sure that private agents receive clear signals about the tax rates they face in the future—is
intrinsic to the tax policy process. This paper develops an analytical framework to study
the econometric implications of ﬁscal foresight. Simple theoretical examples show that fore-
sight produces equilibrium time series with nonfundamental representations, which misalign
the agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets. Economically meaningful shocks to
taxes, therefore, cannot generally be extracted from statistical innovations in conventional
ways. Econometric analyses that fail to align agents’ and the econometrician’s information
sets can produce distorted inferences about the eﬀects of tax policies. The paper documents
the sensitivity of econometric inferences of tax eﬀects to details about how tax information
ﬂows into the economy. We show that alternative assumptions about the information ﬂows
that give rise to ﬁscal foresight can reconcile the diverse empirical ﬁndings in the literature
on anticipated tax changes.
1. Introduction
Fiscal policy presents researchers with a unique empirical challenge: how to identify and
quantify the impacts of foreseen “shocks” to taxes. The challenge posed by taxes is unique
because few economic phenomena provide economic agents with such clear signals about
how important margins will change in the future. Intrinsic to the process of changing taxes
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are two kinds of lags: the legislative lag, between when new tax law is proposed and when it
is passed, and the implementation lag, between when the legislation is signed into law and
when it actually takes eﬀect. Estimates of the total lag range from a couple of months to
two years or more, depending on the particular legislation being considered [Steigerwald and
Stuart (1997), Romer and Romer (2007b), Yang (2008)].
Public ﬁnance economists recognize the possibility of ﬁscal foresight and have accumulated
empirical evidence of its importance using a variety of econometric and event-study tech-
niques.
1 Macroeconomists have acknowledged the possibility of ﬁscal foresight in empirical
work, but the empirics are typically not solidly grounded in theory. This paper is the ﬁrst
theoretical attempt to systematically study the econometric implications of ﬁscal foresight.
Empirical ﬁndings from macroeconomic time series about the impacts of ﬁscal foresight are
all over the map.
2 Existing work concludes that an anticipated cut in taxes may have little
or no eﬀect [Poterba (1988), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer (2007a)], may
be expansionary in the short run [Mountford and Uhlig (2008)], or may be contractionary
in the short run [Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986), House and Shapiro (2006), Mertens
and Ravn (2008)]. We use simple analytical examples and a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to U.S. data to rationalize these diverse ﬁndings as
the outcomes of alternative assumptions about the information sets underlying empirical
work.
Theory suggests that ﬁscal foresight poses a substantial challenge to econometric analyses
of ﬁscal policy. Foresight creates an equilibrium in which the information sets of economic
agents and the econometrician tend to be misaligned, with agents basing their choices on
more information than the econometrician possesses. Structural shocks to tax policy, then,
cannot be recovered from current and past ﬁscal data, a central assumption of conventional
econometric methods. Instead, conventional methods can lead the econometrician to label
as “tax shocks” objects that are linear combinations of all the exogenous disturbances at
various leads and lags.
An important ﬁnding of the paper is that econometric inferences about tax eﬀects can
be highly sensitive to details about how information about taxes ﬂows to economic decision
makers. Information ﬂows determine how news about taxes signals subsequent realizations
of tax rates. It is natural to pose this as a signal-extraction problem that faces both agents,
who are interpreting the news, and the econometrician, who is trying to identify the latent
news from observables. This emphasizes an aspect of the economic structure—information
ﬂows—that macroeconomists often do not explore.
Strong assumptions about information ﬂows, like those typically made in DSGE models,
can help to resolve the econometric diﬃculties that foresight presents. Once the information
structure of the economy has been speciﬁed, a solution to the signal-extraction problem
is available through the use of, for example, the Kalman ﬁlter. Of course, the solution is
conditional on the speciﬁed information ﬂows, an aspect of the economic structure about
1Evidence of foresight leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is documented in Auerbach and Slemrod
(1997)a n dBurman, Clausing, and O’Hare (1994).
2The problems associated with ﬁscal foresight apply with equal force to estimated dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models of ﬁscal policy, such as Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994), Coenen and Straub
(2004), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2006), or Kamps (2007).FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 3
which economists rarely have well developed prior beliefs. That foresight poses a structural
problem and not merely a statistical problem has not been widely appreciated, even in work
that focuses on foresight of various kinds; it is also not readily resolved.
Fiscal foresight poses a formidable challenge because, as Leeper (1989)a n dYang (2005)
show, it generates an equilibrium with a nonfundamental representation. A nonfundamen-
tal representation is one in which the equilibrium time series contains a moving average
component that is not invertible in current and past observables.
3 Issues associated with
nonfundamentalness were pointed out in the rational expectations econometrics literature
by Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1991)a n dLippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994) and recently em-
phasized by Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007).
4 To the
extent that ﬁscal foresight is an intrinsic feature of the tax policy process, conventional
econometric work on ﬁscal policy ascribes to the econometrician an information set that is
strictly smaller than the information set on which agents base their decisions.
This paper oﬀers three contributions that are distinct from previous work on nonfunda-
mental equilibria:
(1) It identiﬁes an important practical instance—ﬁscal policy—that is likely to give rise
to noninvertible equilibria and it oﬀers some evidence that private agents possess and
react to news about future tax changes.
(2) Rather than simply positing a nonfundamental driving process in an economic model,
we obtain a nonfundamental equilibrium through the information ﬂows implied by
the government’s technology for choosing tax rates (the government policy rule).
The nonfundamentalness that arises from ﬁscal foresight is a natural by-product of
the fact that agents’ optimal intertemporal decisions discount future tax obligations.
Although private agents discount tax rates in the usual way, they discount recent tax
news more heavily than past news because with foresight the recent news informs
about taxes in the more distant future. The econometrician, in contrast, discounts
in the usual way, down weighting older news relative to recent news. Agents and the
econometrician employ diﬀerent discounting patterns because the econometrician’s
information set lags the agents’.
(3) We go beyond the binary test of invertibility proposed, for example, by Fernandez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) to assess the quantitative
importance of nonfundamentalness in a calibrated DSGE model drawn from the
class of models being ﬁt to data. We couch the quantitative assessment in terms of
tax multipliers and show that conventional econometric methods, such as identiﬁed
3Throughout the paper, we use the terms “nonfundamental” and “noninvertible” interchangeably.
4A closely related line of work examines the conditions under which a ﬁnite-order VAR can adequately
capture agents’ informationsets when state variables are excluded from the VAR system [for example, Cooley
and Dwyer (1995), Fry and Pagan (2005), Kapetanios, Pagan, and Scott (2005), Giannone, Reichlin, and
Sala (2006), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Chung and Leeper (2007), Dungey and Fry (2007)]. This work
argues that expanding the VAR to include important state variables can solve the invertibility problem.
Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright (2003)a n dFaust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) do not directly address
non-invertibility, but they use high-frequency ﬁnancial data to expand the econometrician’s information set
to aid in identifying monetary policy eﬀects. Fiscal foresight is distinctive because data on the missing
state variable—exogenous changes in anticipated future tax rates—are not readily available nor are they
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VARs, can produce wildly inaccurate inferences: multipliers can be estimated to be
positive, negative, or zero and they can be ﬁve or more times too large over various
forecast horizons. Within such a model we probe the sensitivity of such errors in
inference to alternative assumptions of how news about taxes ﬂows into the economy.
Whereas Lippi and Reichlin (1993) argue that economic theory does not necessarily
rule out nonfundamental representations, we show that for ﬁscal policy, plausible
hypotheses about the ﬂow of information about tax changes imply that fundamental
representations cannot necessarily be ruled in.
This paper focuses exclusively on foresight about taxes, but misalignment of agents’ and
the econometrician’s information sets, and the possibility of nonfundamental equilibrium
representations, is a widespread problem in macroeconomics. A prominent exampleis Quah’s
(1990) resolution of Deaton’s (1987) paradox; the resolution relies on agents forecasting
future income using strictly more information than the econometrician does. Fernandez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005) contains several examples of DSGE models
that in some regions of the parameter space exhibit an invertibility problem.
Nonfundamentalness is likely to present itself in several areas of research that are now
receiving attention: news about future technological improvement [Beaudry and Portier
(2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007), Jaimovich and Sergio (2008), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2008)]; foresight about large government spending run ups [Ramey (2007)];
recent moves by several inﬂation-targeting central banks—Norges Bank, Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, Sveriges Riksbank—to publish paths of future policy interest rates [Holmsen,
Qvigstad, and Roisland (2007), Blattner, Catenaro, Ehrmann, Strauch, and Turunen (2008),
Laseen, Linde, and Svensson (2008)]. Any of these applications, when studied in a rational
expectations model, would lend themselves to the type of analysis that we conduct. Our
paper raises a warning ﬂag about econometric work on these topics and calls for careful
modeling of the information ﬂows that give rise to economic foresight in general.
2. Evidence of Fiscal Foresight
Plenty of reduced-form and anecdotal evidence, mostly in the form of case studies of one
or more tax episodes, suggests that private agents respond to expected changes in taxes.
Reactions to tax foresight are most evident when policy changes are phased in, incorporate
sunset provisions, or include a delay between enactment and eﬀective dates.
Steigerwald and Stuart (1997) develop a residual-based test statistic, which allows com-
parison of prediction errors for econometric models under diﬀerent assumptions about the
period of tax foresight. By studying investment behavior around major tax legislation that
altered corporate income tax rates, investment tax credits, or the deductions for deprecia-
tion allowances, Steigerwald and Stuart conclude that ﬁrms had 4.5-month foresight for tax
changes in 1954, 1962, and 1981, and 16.5-month foresight for the tax reform of 1986.
In contrast to Steigerwald-Stuart, Poterba’s (1988) study of consumption responses to
tax announcements associated with legislation in 1964, 1968, 1975, 1981, and 1986, ﬁnds
little evidence of anticipatory behavior. He dates expectational changes as occurring the
month the legislation passes Congress. Poterba regards his ﬁndings as “tentative” becauseFISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 5
his event study “is likely to have relatively low power against the alternative hypothesis that
consumers gradually revise their expectations of future tax policy and adjust consumption
accordingly” [p. 416].
The possibility that ﬁscal foresight can produce a “purely anticipatory recession” was ﬁrst
put forth by Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986) in an exploration of President Reagan’s tax
cuts. The Economic Recovery Tax Act, enacted in August 1981, announced a three-stage
tax cut to be phased in from 1982 to 1984. Branson, Fraga, and Johnson argue that in
an open-economy IS-LM model, anticipated tax cuts can reconcile three salient features of
the U.S. macro experience of the early 1980s: an inverted and steep real yield curve, real
appreciation of the dollar, and a severe recession—all of which occurred in 1981 and 1982,
before the tax cuts were fully realized. Mertens and Ravn (2008) make a similar argument
using a modern DSGE model and the time series on forecasted tax changes that Romer and
Romer (2007b) compiled.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 oﬀered public ﬁnance economists a rich laboratory in which
to test hypotheses that economic agents may respond to news about tax changes before
the changes are eﬀective. The legislation, which was enacted in October 1986, repealed the
capital gains exclusion from ordinary income, raising the maximum capital gains tax rate
beginning in 1987 from an eﬀective rate of 20 percent to 28 percent. During the lag between
enactment and eﬀective dates, capital gains realizations jumped from $172 billion in 1985
to $328 billion in 1986 in anticipation of the tax hike [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2002,
Table 1, p. 3)].
Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) thoroughly review the economic eﬀects of the 1986 reform.
They also point out the jump in long-term capital gains realizations that predated the
eﬀective date of the reform [see also Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare (1994)]. Auerbach and
Slemrod argue that the 1986 Act “established once and for all that the timing of capital
gains realizations behavior can be enormously sensitive to anticipated changes in the rate of
taxation” [p. 605]. The act also reduced marginal corporate tax rates from a maximum of
46 percent in 1986 to a maximum of 34 percent over 1987 and 1988. Scholes, Willson, and
Wolfson (1992) ﬁnd that the corporate tax rate reduction induced ﬁrms to act in anticipation
to defer revenue recognition or accelerate expense recognition.
Figure 1 documents two instances in which anticipations of the tax code changes associated
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 spilled over to aﬀect monetary policy behavior. The ﬁgure
plots the daily federal funds rate from December 29, 1984 through January 9, 1988. At
the end of both 1985 and 1986, the daily federal funds rate spiked as traders shifted their
portfolios to get ahead of expected restrictive tax legislation. On December 31, 1985 the
funds rate rose almost 4.5 percentage points when, after the House of Representatives passed
the legislation on December 17, traders placed higher probability that tax reform would take
eﬀect during 1986. As it happened, the bill was not enacted until October 22, 1986, to be
eﬀective on January 1, 1987. This is why the funds rate more than doubled on December
30, 1986, and remained high on the last day of 1986. Despite repeated injections of funds
throughout the year, the trading desk at the New York Fed underestimated the extent to
which money markets would react to foresight about tax policy changes [see Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (1986, 1987)].FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 6









Figure 1. Daily Federal Funds Rate
A well-documented example of behavior due to foresight underlies the controversy related
to estimating the taxable income elasticity with respect to the tax hike for the high-income
group that was embedded in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Feldstein and
Feenberg (1996) examine the changes in income and tax data from 1992 to 1993 and ﬁnd
a large taxable income elasticity for the high-income group. Their ﬁnding implies that an
increase in the marginal tax rate has a strong negative eﬀect on the tax base. Goolsbee
(2000), on the other hand, ﬁnds this elasticity drops to 0.4 if the data are extended to 1995.
As the share of time-shiftable compensation (such as one-time bonuses, exercising stock
options, and so forth) rose dramatically with income from 1991 to 1992, the contrasting
estimates of a high short-run and low long-run elasticity arise because high-income taxpayers
in 1992 acted upon their foresight about anticipated higher income tax rates.
House and Shapiro (2006) use a neoclassical growth model with ﬁscal foresight to calibrate
the macroeconomic eﬀects of President Bush’s phased-in cuts in capital and labor tax rates
beginning in 2001. They argue that the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, especially in
the job market, can be attributed to the law’s phasing-in provisions, which created incentives
for workers and ﬁrms to delay production. Elimination of the phase-ins in 2003, moreover,
accounted for about half of the rebound in GDP in the middle of 2003. In recent work, House
and Shapiro (2008) estimate that investment in qualiﬁed types of capital—capital with a tax
recovery period of up to 20 years—rose in anticipation of the bonus depreciation provision
of the law. Investment began to rise after the House of Representatives passed the bill in
October 2001, before President Bush signed the legislation in March 2002.
Evidence of the impacts of ﬁscal foresight extends well beyond a single piece of legislation.
Yang (2007) compares responses to a typical tax innovation from VAR systems with and
without interest rates and prices. She ﬁnds that adding the three-month Treasury billFISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 7
rate and the GDP price deﬂator (or commodity prices) to a VAR substantially reduces
the responses of labor, investment, and output to a tax innovation. Since ﬁnancial markets
tend to be relatively sensitive to news in the economy, the result is consistent with the
interpretation that information contained in ﬁnancial variables reﬂects agents’ knowledge
of future tax policy changes. Sims (1988) ﬁnds similar results for government spending
multipliers.
Fiscal foresight may also apply to government spending: anticipated shifts in spending may
trigger changes in economic behavior before the spending shift is realized. Recent eﬀorts by
Ramey (2007) to reconcile the discrepancies in the eﬀects of government spending using
the narrative approach based on war dummies and VAR approaches lead her to conclude
that the VAR-based innovations are indeed anticipated.
5 Since the war dates are identiﬁed
based on the timing when the media reported future defense buildups, the news reports
predate the actual rises in defense spending. Ramey ﬁnds that the war dates Granger-cause
defense spending and aggregate government spending, but not vice versa. This supports the
existence of foresight about government spending policy.
There is a line of work that is often interpreted as providing evidence that consumers
do not adjust savings in response to anticipated changes in taxes and that, therefore, ﬁscal
foresight is unlikely to be important in time series data. The work, which uses natural tax
experiments to test the permanent income hypothesis, ﬁnds that agents respond strongly to
predictable changes in tax liabilities and to current disposable income, a result that is taken
as evidence against the hypothesis.
6 Because these papers focus on responses at the time of
or after the implementation of the policy change, they are silent about how behavior changes
during the foresight period. In fact, in a neoclassical growth model, where the permanent
income hypothesis holds, consumption responds both at the time that news about a future
change in capital or labor tax rates arrives and after the implementation of the tax rate
change [see Yang (2005)].
The evidence of ﬁscal foresight recounted here, although not decisive, does support the
view that some adjustment in behavior occurs before tax changes are implemented. The
evidence, however, is typically rather casual, relying on case studies, and it is often not
tightly connected to theory. We now turn to an illustrative model in which some of the
econometric implications of ﬁscal foresight can be derived explicitly.
5See Ramey and Shapiro (1998)a n dEdelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) for empirical analysis of
the dynamic impacts of war dummies.
6Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) use survey data to evaluate consumption responses to reductions in the
income tax withholding as ordered by President Bush in early 1992. Parker (1999) studies withholding
changes in Social Security taxes using sample drawn from 1980 and 1993 and Souleles (1999) studies changes
to the receipts of tax refunds based on sample drawing from 1980 to 1991. Souleles (2002) examines the
consumption eﬀect in response to withholding changes due to the pre-announced, phase-II income tax rate
cuts in the Economic Recovery Tax Act. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2004) study President Bush’s tax
rebate in 2001. In an earlier study, very much in the spirit of this line of work, Poterba and Summers
(1987) ﬁnds a failure of Ricardian equivalence, but acknowledge that their analysis is uninformative about
the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 8
3. Analytical Example
In this section, we introduce ﬁscal foresight into a simple economic environment so that
the econometric issues can be exposited analytically. The results and conclusions reached in
this section and the next extend to more general setups, as discussed in section 5.
Consider a standard growth model with log preferences, inelastic labor supply, and com-
plete depreciation of capital. A proportional tax is levied against income. The equilibrium
conditions are well known and given by
1
Ct






Ct + Kt = Yt = AtK
α
t−1 (2)
where Ct, Kt,a n dYt denote time-t consumption, capital, and output, respectively, and {At}
is an exogenous technology shock. As usual, 0 <α<1a n d0<β<1. The government
sets the tax rate according to a time-invariant rule and then adjusts lump-sum transfers to
satisfy the constraint, Tt = τtYt. Government spending is identically zero.
After log linearizing equations (1)–(2), the equilibrium is characterized by a second-order
diﬀerence equation in capital
Etkt+1 − (θ
−1 + α)kt + αθ










where θ = αβ(1 − τ) is a particularly important constant in the analysis and 0 ≤ τ<1i s
the steady state tax rate. The solution to (3) satisﬁes the well-known saddlepath property
and is given by








Equilibrium investment depends negatively on the expected discounted present value of
future tax rates, a well-known result [Lucas (1976), Abel (1982), Judd (1985), Auerbach
(1989)]. Of course, more distant tax rates are discounted relative to more recent rates.
To model foresight, we must specify how news about taxes signals future tax rates. For
many of the points we wish to make, it suﬃces to assume that tax information ﬂows take a
particularly simple form: agents at t receive a signal that tells them exactly what tax rate
they will face in period t + q. The tax rule is τt =¯ τeετ,t−q, or in log-linearized form7
ˆ τt = ετ,t−q (5)
where ˆ τ denotes percentage deviations of the tax rate from its steady state value.
8 We
assume the technology and tax shocks are i.i.d. and the representative agent’s information
s e ta td a t et consists of variables dated t and earlier, including the shocks, {εA,t,ε τ,t}. Given
the tax rule in (5), this implies that the agent at t has (in this case, perfect) knowledge of
{ˆ τt+q, ˆ τt+q−1,...}.
7We will assume a bounded support on ετ for each speciﬁcation of the tax rule to ensure the realizations
are bounded between 0 and 1.
8Jaimovich and Sergio (2008) assume an analogous process for the arrival of news about total factor
productivity or investment-speciﬁc shocks.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 9
It is useful to use the information ﬂows in the tax rule to solve for expected tax rates in
(4) for various degrees of ﬁscal foresight.
q = 0 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t (6)
q = 1 implies:






q = 2 implies:








q = 3 implies:









If there is no foresight, q =0 , we get the usual result that i.i.d. shocks to tax rates have
no eﬀect on capital accumulation. When there is some degree of tax foresight (q>0),
we obtain the unusual implication that even serially uncorrelated tax hikes reduce capital
accumulation.
In this model with inelastic labor supply, i.i.d. tax shocks should not aﬀect capital accu-
mulation. As expression (7) makes clear, when there is one period of foresight, tax shocks
appear to aﬀect capital contemporaneously. Moving average terms and, therefore, potential
invertibility problems appear to arise only when the foresight horizon is greater than one
period. This result is not general and stems from the assumption of ﬁxed labor. When labor
choice is elastic, even one period of foresight can produce an equilibrium with a noninvertible
moving average component.
An interesting, though seemingly perverse, implication of (8)a n d( 9)i st h a tm o r erecent
news is discounted (by θ = αβ(1− τ) < 1) relative to older news. This is because with two-
quarter foresight, ετ,t−1 aﬀects ˆ τt+1, while ετ,t aﬀects ˆ τt+2, so the news that aﬀects tax rates
farther into the future receives the heaviest discount. Tax rates are discounted in the usual
way, while tax news is discounted in reverse order. We now explore the broader ramiﬁcations
of this discounting result.
4. The Econometrics of Foresight
This section explores the question: What erroneous conclusions might be drawn by an
econometrician who does not explicitly model tax foresight and proceeds with conventional
econometric analyses, such as identiﬁed VARs?9
9Much of the analysis that follows draws on Hansen and Sargent (1991).FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 10
4.1. Misalignment of Information Sets and Improper Discounting. With ﬁscal fore-
sight, the information set of private agents may be larger than the econometrician’s informa-
tion set. The Wold representation theorem tells us that the econometrician’s information set
from estimating a VAR will be the sigma algebra generated by current and past observable
variables. In the analytical example, foresight implies that agents will observe tax news
before the tax rates are realized. Information sets of private agents will not coincide with
the information generated by observable variables, which the econometrician possesses.
We begin with the case in which the econometrician is well informed, observing the tech-
nology shock exactly. Suppose that agents have two-quarter foresight and the econometrician

















yt = M(L)t, (10)
where κ =( 1− θ)(τ/(1 − τ)), θ = αβ(1 − τ)a n dL is a lag operator (i.e., Lsxt = xt−s). If
this system is invertible in nonnegative powers of L,t h e nt may be obtained as a square-
summable linear combination of current and past yt. This suggests that knowledge of past
and present y is equivalent to knowledge of past and present , and forecast errors generated
by the econometrician’s VAR will coincide with the agents’.10 A necessary condition for
(10) to be a fundamental Wold representation is that the determinant of M(z)b ea n a l y t i c
with no zeros inside the open unit disk.11 By direct calculation, det M(z)= κ
1−αz(z +θ), so
this representation has a zero inside the unit circle (at z = −θ). Fiscal foresight implies the
information set generated by {yt,yt−1,yt−2,...} is smaller than the information set generated
by {t,t−1,t−2,...}.
It is useful to think about this invertibility condition for each shock process individually.
By assumption the econometrician directly observes current and past technology shocks
{εA,t,ε A,t−1,...}. Conditioning on current and past capital, however, will not reveal current
and past tax shocks. The reason is that while the technology process is an invertible repre-
sentation, the process for capital is not. The solution for capital with two-quarter foresight
is given by
(1 − αL)kt = −κ(L + θ)ετ,t






is a convergent sequence. Because θ = αβ(1−τ) < 1, the process is not invertible in current







−1 + θ)kt+1 − θ(α
−1 + θ)kt+2 + θ
2(α
−1 + θ)kt+3 −···+ α
−1κετ,t. (11)
10More speciﬁcally, the Hilbert space generated by {yt−j}∞
j=0 is equivalent (in mean-square norm) to the
Hilbert space generated by {t−j}∞
j=0.
11This assumes that “noninvertible” means a root inside the unit circle.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 11
In this VAR setting, the only way that the econometrician can recover the ﬁscal news seen
by agents at time t is if the econometrician has knowledge of future variables.
12
Foresight concerning ﬁscal policy introduces a noninvertible moving average representa-
tion into the equilibrium. This non-invertibility implies the econometrician will not be able
to condition on current and past ετ,t. In order to determine the econometrician’s information
set, we need to derive the one-step-ahead forecast errors associated with predicting yt con-
ditional only on its past values. This is achieved by ﬂipping the root of the moving average
representation from inside the unit circle to outside the unit circle via the Blaschke factor,































which yields the representation for capital as











      
= −κ(1 + θL) ε
∗
τ,t












Note that by observing current and past capital, the econometricianrecoverscurrent and past
ε∗
τ, which are not the news that private agents observe, ετ. The econometrician’s innovations
are the statistical shocks of the VAR, which turn out to represent information that is mostly













= θετ,t+( 1− θ
2)ετ,t−1 − θ(1 − θ
2)ετ,t−2 + θ
2(1 − θ
2)ετ,t−3 + ··· (14)
The mapping in (14) shows that what the econometrician believes to be the tax innovation
at time t, ε∗
t, is actually a discounted sum of the tax news observed by the agents at date t
and earlier.
An important implicationis that the econometricianwho ignores foresight will discount the
innovations incorrectly. Comparing (13)w i t h( 8), according to the econometrician’s VAR,
yesterday’s innovation has less eﬀect than today’s innovation (note the terms θε∗
τ,t−1 + ε∗
τ,t
in (13)). Agents with foresight, in contrast, discount news according to ετ,t−1+θετ,t because
yesterday’s news has a larger eﬀect on capital accumulation than today’s news. Diﬀerences
in discounting patterns applied by the econometrician and the agents lead to a variety of
econometric problems.
Mapping (14) also reveals that an equilibrium might fail to be invertible—θ<1—yet
the noninvertibility may be quantitatively unimportant. Suppose θ is just below 1. Then,
12Instrumental variables have been employed to deal with ﬁscal foresight [Blanchard and Perotti (2002)].
This representation demonstrates the properties necessary for valid instruments for foresight in this model.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 12













Figure 2a: Response of K
















Figure 2b: Response of Y
Figure 2. Responses of Capital and Output to Tax Increase. VAR system
includes (at,k t)  with α =0 .36,β=0 .99,τ =0 .25
a c c o r d i n gt o( 14), ε∗
τ,t will be “close enough” to ετ,t that the econometrician’s estimates
of tax eﬀects will not be far wrong. Section 5 examines the quantitative importance of
noninvertibility in a calibrated DSGE model.
4.2. Econometric Implications. By employing VAR analysis and not modeling foresight,
the econometrician has unknowingly conditioned on a smaller information set and misspec-
iﬁed the true dynamics of the equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the consequence of this mis-
speciﬁcation is that inference provided by VARs may be quite misleading. The size of the
approximation error depends upon several factors—the complexity of the tax rule (5), the
conditioning variables in the VAR, the structural parameters, the degree of foresight, and so
forth. We show below how these factors confound the analysis in the present setting.
Impulse response functions are a widely used tool for conveying how agents dynamically
respond to innovations, but response functions based upon the econometrician’s information
set {ε∗
τ,t} will not capture these responses. Consider the response functions generated by
(10)a n d( 12). Figure 2 plots the responses of capital and output assuming two-quarter
foresight (setting α =0 .36,β =0 .99,τ =0 .25). With foresight, agents know exactly when
the innovation in ﬁscal policy is going to translate into changes in the tax rate. This creates
the sharp decline in capital one quarter after the shock and in output two quarters out, as the
dotted-dashed lines indicate. The econometrician’s VAR, on the other hand, discounts the
innovations incorrectly and gives a very diﬀerent response to the tax shock. According to the
econometrician, the biggest decline in capital will occur on impact, suggesting that foresight
does not exist (solid lines). The diﬀerence between the response functions can be quite
dramatic, especially at short horizons. Note that the drop in output for the econometrician’s
VAR is nearly four times as large as the true response one quarter after the innovation.
Figure 2 shows that the econometrician will infer that the tax shock is unanticipated.
Obviously, not all shocks that aﬀect ﬁscal policy will be knowable several quarters in advance.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 13
Consider a tax rate process, ˆ τt = eu
τ,t + ετ,t−q, that allows for shocks that are anticipated
several quarters in advance (ετ) and for surprises that are unanticipated (eu
τ)a tt i m et.13 If
these shocks are orthogonal at all leads and lags, then the equilibriumdynamics of (3) will not
change because i.i.d. tax shocks will not alter the dynamics of capital. The econometrician,
who does not account for ﬁscal foresight and proceeds to estimate (12), will attribute all of
the dynamics associated with the anticipated component of the tax rate to the unanticipated
component. This suggests that researchers interested in the dynamic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy—
whether the interest is in anticipated or unanticipated changes in policy—must explicitly
account for foresight in order to avoid spurious conclusions.
Fiscal foresight becomes even more pernicious if we make the more plausible assumption
that the econometrician does not observe technology shocks and, therefore, cannot condition
on {εA,t,ε A,t−1,...}. It is more natural for the econometrician to condition on observable
taxes (or some function of taxes, such as revenues), rather than the technology process.

















xt = H(L)t. (15)
As in the previous case, foresight creates a zero inside the unit circle (now at z = 0), implying
that the information set generated by {xt,xt−1,xt−2,...} is smaller than the information set
generated by {t,t−1,t−2,...}. The corresponding Wold representation for (15) is derived










































⎦, ˜ W =
 
Δ(1 + κ2θ2) −Δκ







and Δ = [(1 + κ2θ2)2 + κ2]−1/2. In this case, the orthonormal W matrix must be em-
ployed to ensure the representation remains causal (i.e., preserves the assumption that the
econometrician does not observe future values of the variables).
Now the econometric problems are more severe. First, the econometrician who proceeds
with VAR analysis using (16) will likely obtain an impulse response function in which fore-
sight does not appear to exist in the data. Figure 3a depicts the response of capital to a tax
increase for the agent and econometrician (dotted-dashed line) as the variance of the tech-
nology shock varies from 0.01 to 1 (using the calibration α =0 .36,β=0 .99,τ =0 .25). This
ﬁgure shows that conditioning on the econometrician’s information set the path of capital is
ﬂat when σ2
a = σ2
τ = 1. In theory, unanticipated i.i.d. capital tax shocks have no eﬀects on
13Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) posit a process like this for a technology shock and
interpret realizations of the ε terms as news.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 14











Figure 3a: Response of K to Tax Increase
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Figure 3. Responses of Capital. VAR system includes (τt,k t) 
the economy. Based on the ﬂat response of capital, an econometrician will then infer that
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are limited to unanticipated components only. By not modeling
foresight, one may achieve a “self-fulﬁlling prophesy” and wrongly conclude that foresight is
not an issue.
Second, as the variance of the tax shock increases relative to the technology shock, the
errors associated with foresight become more pronounced. Figure 3a shows that the initial
response of K to a one standard deviation increase in the tax shock increases from 0 to
0.12 as σ2
a varies from 1 to 0.01, respectively, so that an anticipated tax increase could be
estimated to have no eﬀect or a positive eﬀect on capital and output.
Existing empirical work reports a diverse set of inferences about the eﬀects of an antici-
pated tax increase on output, ranging from little or no eﬀect to contractionary to expansion-
ary. Figures 2aa n d3a demonstrate that even this simple model can deliver the diverse set
of results found in the empirical literature. In our case an anticipated tax increase always
lowers capital and output. The diﬀerent solid lines in the ﬁgures arise from confronting the
econometrician with diﬀerent signal-extraction problems. This suggests that foresight and
how it is handled econometrically is a leading cause of the diverse results.
Third, the statistical shocks recovered by the VAR analysis are now linear combinations
of both technology and tax shocks. From (16), the statistical shocks can be written as
ε
∗
τ,t = a1ετ,t−2 − a2ετ,t−1 + a3εA,t−2 + a4εA,t−1,ε
∗
A,t = −a4ετ,t−1 − a3ετ,t− a2εA,t−1 + a1εA,t
(17)
where the a’s are complicated functions of α,β,a n dτ. The econometrician will not only
misinterpret the response to a tax shock but also the response to a technology shock. Figure
3b demonstrates that the econometrician would infer a very large and persistent response
of capital to a technology shock (solid line), when in fact the true dynamics are relatively
small (dotted-dashed line). Comparing (17)w i t h( 14), one sees that the statistical shocks
generated by (16) are not convolutions of the entire history of the structural shocks butFISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 15
only depend upon structural shocks dated t − 2 and earlier. This is due entirely to the
simple tax rule (ˆ τt = ετ,t−2). As the model and information ﬂows become more realistic, this
problem can become more severe. This example has a key message: foresight impinges on
the econometrician’s ability to correctly identify all shocks in the VAR.
Finally, as also emphasized by Hansen and Sargent (1991), variance decompositions in















denote the j-step ahead prediction error variance associated with the econometrician’s in-
formation set, where Σ∗ is the variance-covariance matrix associated with (ε∗
τ,t,ε ∗
A,t) .L i k e
impulse response functions, variance decompositions are derived using conditional expecta-
tions and hence the discrepancy in the information sets implies the coeﬃcients generated
by H∗(L) will lead to a misallocation of the variance across the structural shocks. Figure
3a suggests that the econometrician will treat the tax shock as nearly i.i.d. and infer that
none of the variation in capital (and hence output) can be attributed to tax innovations.
Consequently, all of the variation will be attributed to the technology shock. This result
would continue to hold even if, in fact, the tax shock explained nearly all of the variation in
capital (for example, by setting the variance of the technology shock, σ2
A, arbitrarily small).
4.3. Testing Economic Theory. An extension of the econometric implications is that
tests of economic theory will also be misspeciﬁed. One important example pertaining to
ﬁscal policy is the testing of the government’s present-value constraint, which links the value
of government debt to the expected discounted value of future primary surpluses. A widely-
used approach to test present-value restrictions estimates a VAR with debt and surpluses
and then tests for the cross-equation restrictions that the present-value condition imposes
on the model [Campbell and Shiller (1987) ] .A sw eh a v es h o w n ,ﬁ s c a lf o r e s i g h ti m p l i e st h e
VAR obtained by the econometrician will not yield the true dynamics and hence will not
impose the correct cross-equation restrictions in testing the present value condition.
To see how foresight will lead to type I error in present-value tests, consider an endowment
economy with lump sum taxes, a constant equilibrium real interest rate, and one-quarter
foresight with respect to innovations in surpluses (receipts less expenditures net of interest
payments on the government’s debt). Taking expectations conditional on information at
time t − 1 of the government’s ﬂow budget constraint yields
E(bt|Ωt−1)=β
−1bt−1 − E(st|Ωt−1), (18)
where st is the primary surplus, bt is one-period debt outstanding, and β−1 =( 1+r)i st h e
constant gross rate of return between time t and t + 1. Fiscal sustainability is ensured by
a policy rule that makes future surpluses rise with debt. Two exogenous disturbances—for
revenues and spending—drive surpluses and agents have one period of foresight over both
14This result holds even though the statistical shocks of the VAR remain uncorrelated. While the uncon-
ditional second moments of the VAR system remain the same due to the orthogonal nature of the Blaschke
and W matrices (WW  = ˜ W ˜ W   = I and B(L)B(L−1)=I), the conditional moments will be diﬀerent.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 16
components of the surpluses. The policy rule is







where γ is set to ensure that the agent’s transversality condition for debt is satisﬁed and
0 <ρ 1,ρ 2 < 1 determine the serial correlation properties of the driving processes. The
expectations are taken with respect to the agents’ information set, which is assumed to
be, Ωt−1 = {ε1,t−j,ε 2,t−j}∞
j=1. If this process holds for t =0 ,1,...T, then imposing the












Following Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991)a n dRoberds (1991), the cross-equation





















(1−ρ2L)(1−γL). Two observations spring from (21).
First, foresight impliesthat (21) is not an invertiblerepresentation (due to the zero at L =0 ) .
Second, the cross-equation restrictions imposed on the moving-average representation are
nonlinear.
In light of the second observation, Campbell and Shiller (1987) derive the present-value
restrictions on the VAR representation instead of the moving-average representation. This
simpliﬁcation makes the present-value constraint easy to test, as it amounts to restrictions
on the coeﬃcients of the VAR. Denote the invertible representation of (21)b yP∗(L)a n d






































∗yt−1 + wt (22)
Note that A∗(L)=P(L)∗−1, implying that the coeﬃcients of the VAR will not yield the
correct cross-equation restrictions implied by (21) when there is foresight. Campbell and
Shiller (1987) show that the restrictions on the VAR coeﬃcients implied by the present-
value constraint are given by
a11 + a21 =0 ,a 22 + a12 = β
−1 (23)
15Given the structure of the non-invertibility, the invertible representation is obtained as in (16).FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 17
With foresight, however, the restrictions given by (23) will not hold even though the present-
value constraint is satisﬁed. The VAR estimates give
a11 + a21 =
ηρ1ρ2βA(β)C(β)
ρ2C(β) − ρ1A(β)
,a 22 + a12 =
A(β)ηρ2ρ1(C(β) − A(β))
β(ρ2C(β) − ρ1A(β))
where η =( 1+[ A(β)C(β)]2)−1/2. Therefore, the econometrician will incorrectly reject the
null hypothesis that the present-value constraint holds.
Sargent (1981) calls for Granger (1969)-Sims (1972) causality tests to play a key role in
helping the econometrician determine which variables properly belong in agents’ information
sets. For example, causality tests are commonly used to justify treating variables as exoge-
nous for purposes of inference. Causality tests, however, are misspeciﬁed if agents have ﬁscal
foresight.
16 To see this more clearly, return to the analytical model of section 3 with one
quarter of foresight and an i.i.d. tax rule. The (true) moving-average representation, on the
left, and the (econometrician’s) fundamental representation, on the right, in the variables





























where δ =( 1+κ2)−1/2. Note that the zero appearing in the true MA will appear in the
opposite oﬀ-diagonal in the econometrician’s representation. By theorem 1 of Sims (1972),
the econometrician’s representation implies that ˆ τ fails to Granger-cause k;i nf a c t ,ˆ τ lies in
a proper subspace of k, and hence k fails to Granger-cause ˆ τ. By not modeling foresight,
the econometrician eﬀectively reverses the Granger-causal ordering of the true dynamics.
5. Quantitative Importance of Foresight
This section examines the prevalence of noninvertibility in a more general setting and
assesses the quantitative importance of foresight. In doing so, the section pushes the analysis
forward in two fresh directions. First, we show that the modeling of information ﬂows,
which to this point has been rather crude, plays a critical role in determining whether the
equilibriumis fundamental. When the equilibriumis nonfundamental, moreover, information
ﬂows inﬂuence the magnitude of the error that an econometrician who does not model
foresight would make. Second, we conduct the analysis in a more complex DSGE model
that is calibrated to U.S. time series [details in appendix A]. By adding many of the features
that researchers commonly include in models that are ﬁt to data, this section moves the
analysis out of the realm of “toy” models and into the class of models now in use for practical
policy analysis. We demonstrate that many of the frictions found in DSGE models tend to
propagate the econometrician’s errors. To assess the quantitative importance of foresight, we
compute dynamic tax multipliers as estimated by an econometrician who ﬁts an identiﬁed
VAR and contrast those estimates to the true tax multipliers.
Two conclusions emerge. First, noninvertibility is a problem that is robust to substantial
variations in model structures and information ﬂows, so long as the information ﬂows imply
16Leeper (1990) shows that ﬁscal foresight can imply that money growth Granger-causes deﬁcits in an
equilibrium in which deﬁcits are systematically monetized.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 18
a suﬃcient degree of foresight. Second, the errors in inference from econometric estimates
that do not confront foresight can be substantial.
5.1. Brief Model Description. As appendix A describes in detail, we extend the basic
neoclassical growth model by adding elastic labor supply, variable utilization rates for cap-
ital, durable and non-durable consumption, habit formation in non-durable consumption,
investment adjustment costs, deliberation costs for durable goods, and seven exogenous
sources of random disturbance. Although this model abstracts from nominal considerations,
it nonetheless includes many of the features that have proven to be important in ﬁtting
DSGE models to data [see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007), Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007)].
Two features of the extended model aim to reﬂect the type of signal-extraction problem
that agents actually face: endogeneity of tax policy and the gradual arrival of news about tax
changes. We incorporate both automatic stabilizers and a systematic adjustment of taxes
to the state of government debt, which relax the assumption of exogenous tax policy in the
analytical example. To move away from perfect foresight, news about tax policy changes at
time t is revealed gradually beginning at t−4, t−3,..., up to t. In log-linearized forms, labor
and capital income tax rates are
ˆ τ
i
t = ρiˆ τ
i
t−1 + qiˆ s
B




where ρi ∈ (0,1), qi ≤ 0, and μi ≥ 0f o ri = K,L. Tax news, as modeled by εi,t−j for
j =1 ,...,4, is assumed to have an MA(4) process. For each i, εi,t is an i.i.d. random variable.
When (25) determines tax choices, agents face a signal-extraction problem because, even if
they observe the ε’s one or more quarters in advance, they do not have advance knowledge
of ˆ Y or ˆ sB. In addition, at time t a surprise piece of news, εi,t, arrives.
Modeling information ﬂows as moving average processes captures the idea that from quar-
ter to quarter news about taxes evolves randomly. News might accumulate, with information
improving and concentrating agents’ probability distributions over future tax rates. Alter-
natively, news might disappoint, with agents’ expectations frustrated by realizations of ε’s
that suddenly reverse earlier expectations. This randomness captures the vagaries of the
political process that determine ﬁscal choices. We restrict
 4
i=0 φi =1a n dφ4 ∈ [0,1]. The
φ’s are interpreted as weights attached to news arriving at diﬀerent periods, reﬂecting their
importance in aﬀecting the tax policy that is ultimately implemented.
5.2. Generalizing Information Flows. Our analytical examples showed that invertibility
hinges on assumptions about information ﬂows and on discount factors that are functions
of the deep parameters of the model. To examine the robustness of our results, we apply
Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson’s (2007) condition for invert-
ibility of the moving-average representation to the more general calibrated DSGE model.
We ﬁnd that incorporating real frictions into the model does not ease the problem of non-
invertibility.
17 As long as φ4 =1a n dφ3 = φ2 = φ1 = φ0 = 0, so that agents have four
quarters of tax foresight, the equilibriumis always noninvertible. However, when news arrives
17We perform 10,000 draws from distributions of parameters that yield a unique equilibrium.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 19
gradually—so that all the φ’s can be nonzero—there are certain parameter combinations that
produce an invertible equilibrium. The crucial factor that determines the impact of foresight
on invertibility, therefore, is the process of information ﬂows in the economy.
The model of section 3 with two periods of foresight provides useful intuition. We focus
on two aspects of the tax process: the persistence of tax shocks and the process governing
the arrival of tax news.
5.2.1. Persistence of Tax Policy. Suppose that the tax process follows ˆ τt = ρˆ τt−1 + ετ,t−2.
Optimal capital accumulation is given by
(1 − αL)(1 − ρL)kt = εA,t −
 
τ(1 − θ)
(1 − τ)(1 − ρθ)
 
 
(1 − ρθ)ετ,t−1 + θετ,t
 
(26)
Assuming the econometrician can correctly identify the technology shock, this representation
is not invertible if θ<(1 + ρ)−1. If the agent discounts recent news more than older news,
then the representation continues to be noninvertible. A highly persistent tax rate implies
the agent will more smoothly discount the shocks and older news will receive more of a
discount vis-´ a-vis the i.i.d. case in expression (8). If the discount factor is large enough
and there is enough persistence in the tax process, the agent will discount in the usual way,
yielding an invertible representation so that the optimal capital sequence will reveal the
agents’ information set.
In the analytical example, however, given θ = αβ(1−τ) and two periods of foresight, any
feasible choice of parameters implies (26) will be not be invertible. Moreover, this result
continues to hold when the tax rate follows an autoregressive process of length n,w h e r en is
greater than or equal to the degree of foresight and is ﬁnite. If the tax rate follows an AR(n)
process with two periods of foresight, tedious algebra shows that the root of the moving
average component of capital is given by







The following theorem will be used to show that if θ<(1 + ρ1)−1, then the capital process
will not be invertible in the AR(n)c a s e .
Theorem 1 (Rouch´ e). Suppose that two functions f and g are analytic inside and on a
simple closed contour C.I f|f(z)| > |g(z)| at each point on C, then the functions f(z) and
f(z)+g(z) have the same numbers of zeros, counting multiplicities, inside C.18
Deﬁne f(z) ≡ θ+z(1−ρ1θ)a n dg(z) ≡ z2ρ3θ3+z3ρ4θ4+···zn−1ρnθn and note that f(·)h a s
a zero inside the unit circle if θ<(1+ρ1)−1. Assuming the AR representation is stationary,  n
j=1 ρj < 1, gives f(·) >g (·) on the unit circle. Therefore, f(z)+g(z) has a zero inside the
unit circle and the representation is not invertible.
5.2.2. News Arrival Process. We now illustrate in the simple analytical model how treat-
ing information as ﬂowing according to a moving average process alters the conditions for
invertibility. Consider the following tax process, which simpliﬁes (25)
ˆ τt = φετ,t−2 +( 1− φ)ετ,t−1 (27)
18See Tutschke and Vasudeva (2005).FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 20
When φ ∈ (0,1), there is no exact degree of foresight. τt+1 depends on information received
both last period and two periods ago. The limitingcases, φ = {0,1}, implya capital sequence
given by expression (7) (which is invertible) or by expression (8) (which is not invertible),
respectively. The parameter φ dictates the relative importance of the news received by the
agents at time t and earlier. The larger is φ, the more weight is given to news received
two periods ago when forecasting future tax rates. To see this more clearly, note that the
equilibrium capital dynamics are given by





{[1 − φ(1 − θ)]ετ,t+ φετ,t−1} (28)
If φ ≈ 1, the tax process implies agents will down weight more recent news (ετ,t)r e l a t i v e
to older news (ετ,t−1). This leads to the perverse discounting of news that makes the repre-
sentation noninvertible. More generally, if more recent news receives the heavier discount,
1 − φ(1 − θ) <φ , then the equilibrium will not be invertible, and the information set of the
agent will not coincide with the econometrician’s.
Major tax news that lays out the future direction of policy tends to arrive several quarters
before tax policy changes are implemented. Once tax legislation is proposed, the subsequent
negotiations between the two parties in Congress can, but often does not, introduce impor-
tant changes in the details of a tax proposal. This suggests that in data, the weight on
the older news tends to be larger than the weight on more recent news. As a result, the
equilibrium is quite likely not to be invertible.
5.2.3. Information Flows and Forecast Errors. The extent to which private agents condition
on information that cannot be captured by current and past variables that are observable
to the econometrician determines the forecast error of an econometric model. The φ’s in
equation (25) indicate the weight given to each piece of tax news, ετ, received in previous
periods. If φ4 = 1, then only the innovations dated t = 4 and earlier will inﬂuence the
current tax rate.
The analytics in section 3 can be used to show that the information discrepancy depends






The variance of the one-step-ahead forecast error for the agent is given by19















19These derivations assume the econometrician observes the technology shock exactly.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 21
φ1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 ← 1 → .30 .09 .02 5.3∗
0.2 ← 1 → .99 .15 .02 3.8∗
0.3 ← 1 → .99 .44 .03 3.1∗
φ2 0.4 1 .99 .56 .25 .06 2.4∗
0.5 .64 .36 .16 .04 2.8∗
0.6 .25 .11 .03 1.5∗
0.7 .08 .02 1.1∗
0.8 .02 0.9∗
0.9 .85∗
Table 1. The entries are the multiplication of the zeros inside the unit cir-
cle for the structural VAR representation. Smaller numbers indicate a larger
discrepancy between the information set of the agent and econometrician, and
unity signiﬁes no discrepancy. A * indicates number multiplied by 10−12.
For the econometrician’s information set, the variance of the forecast error is given by20




















The diﬀerence between (29)a n d( 30) is the discount factor θ.A sθ approaches unity (zero),
the diﬀerence between the agent and econometrician’s information sets is small (large). If
θ is greater than or equal to 1, the representation for capital becomes fundamental and the
variances of the forecast errors (29)a n d( 30) would coincide.
This reasoning extends to the more complex calibrated model. A necessary condition for a
representation, Xt = F(L) t, to be fundamental—and for the variance of the agent’s and the
econometrician’s forecast errors to coincide—is for the determinant of F(L)t oh a v en oz e r o s
inside the unit circle. The number and size of the zeros inside the unit circle will determine
the size of the econometrician’s error when estimating a structural VAR. Smaller numbers
indicate a larger discrepancy between the agent’s and the econometrician’s information sets.
Table 1 is based on the calibrated DSGE model using a tax rule that simpliﬁes (25),
ˆ τt = φ0ετ,t + φ1ετ,t−1 + φ2ετ,t−2. The table reports the multiplication of the zeros of the
structural VAR for the calibrated parameters as the informational assumptions of the tax
processes varies. We assume φ3 = φ4 =0a n dφ1,φ 2 ∈ (0,1) with φ1 + φ2 ≤ 1a n d
φ0 =1− (φ1 + φ2).
Two points are noteworthy. First, as the minor diagonal indicates, if the tax process does
not depend upon contemporaneous innovations (i.e., φ1 + φ2 = 1), the econometrician’s es-
timates will deviate substantially from the truth, with multiplied zeros essentially equal to
20Note that the variance of the Blaschke factor is unity.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 22
zero. In these cases the agent observes the tax innovation in advance, making her one-step-
ahead forecast errors nearly zero. The econometrician does not see the news in advance,
making his forecast errors relatively large. Second, table 1 shows the extent to which infor-
mation ﬂows will alter the errors made by the structural VAR. If most of the weight is on φ0
(upper left part of the table), the structural VAR will not be misspeciﬁed. As more weight
is placed on φ1 and φ2, the errors become very large.
Evidently, the errors in inference made by the econometrician are very sensitive to infor-
mation ﬂows. This conﬁrms our belief that accurately specifying information ﬂows is crucial
to understanding the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. In practice, the legislative and implementation
lags associated with ﬁscal policy create information ﬂows that are likely to produce zeros in
F(L) close to the minor diagonal, suggesting large econometric errors. We turn now to a
closer examination of the errors.
5.2.4. Robustness to Information Flows. We generalize the information ﬂows underlying ta-
ble 1 by returning to the speciﬁcation of tax policy behavior in (25) but randomly drawing
the moving-average coeﬃcients—the φ’s. We ﬁx the model parameters at their calibrated
values in table 2 [appendix A] and draw the information parameters, the φ’s, according to
the following distributions:
φ4 ∼ 1 − β(1.5,5); φ1,φ 2,φ 3 ∼ U[0,0.1] (31)
where the distribution of φ4 is left skewed between 0 and 1 and has a theoretical mean
of 0.77 and standard deviation of 0.15. This distribution assumes that most of the news
regarding changes in ﬁscal policy will be known up to a year in advance. It does not imply, a
priori, that the equilibrium process will be nonfundamental. We believe it is a conservative
approximation to the actual data generating process for U.S. tax policy in that it understates
the degree of foresight in practice.21
For each draw of information parameters (φ’s), we simulate 10 datasets of 500 quarters
by drawing from the seven structural shocks. We estimate the VAR with the following
variables: capital tax rate, revenues, non-durable consumption, durable consumption, in-
vestment, output, and government debt.
22 The tax eﬀects reported by the econometrician
for each draw of information parameters are the mean responses estimated from the 10 sim-
ulated datasets. To separate the issue of identiﬁcation from invertibility, we assume that the
econometrician has the exact income elasticity, μi for i = K,L, in identifying the structural
tax shocks. We conﬁrm that if no foresight is present, this identiﬁcation strategy delivers
accurate estimates.23
Figures 4-6 plot the actual (denoted ∗) and the estimated (denoted +) tax multipliers
at various horizons. The multipliers are dollar changes in output, nondurable consumption,
and investment due to an anticipated increase in the capital tax rate. Impulse responses are
normalized so that the peak response in revenues equals $1. Multipliers are plotted against
21Yang (2008) estimates that the sum of the legislative and implementation lags averages about seven
quarters in the United States, while Mertens and Ravn (2008), drawing on the narrative work by Romer and
Romer (2007b), ﬁgure the median total lag to be six quarters.
22Results are invariant to alternative conditioning variables.
23This assumption is not innocuous. Foresight may make it extremely diﬃcult to reliably estimate the μi
elasticities. We abstract from this diﬃculty, so our results are the best case scenario for the econometrician.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 23
































































Figure 4. Output Multipliers: True Value (∗) and Econometrician’s Esti-
mate (+). Anticipatedincrease in capital taxes using information ﬂows implied
by policy rule (25).
1−φ0 on the vertical axes, which serves as a measure of the degree of foresight: when φ0 =0
there is no exogenous surprise in tax rates; when φ0 = 1 there is no exogenous advanced
news about tax rates.
Empirical estimates of output multipliers following a $1 surprise change in tax revenues
vary widely. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate a peak response of output between
−$1.33 and −$0.78, while Mountford and Uhlig (2008) estimate a much larger response of
−$3.23. The multipliers in ﬁgures 4-6 are not strictly comparable because they pertain to
an anticipated increase in the capital tax rate that raises revenues by $1, with no correlated
shock to the labor tax rate.
The ﬁgures show that as the degree of foresight varies—along the vertical axis—the econo-
metrician’s estimated multiplierscan deviate dramatically from the truth. The bias is largest
at the one-year horizon, which coincides with the maximum degree of foresight. Biases can
be very large: $3 for output, a factor of ﬁve for consumption, and a factor of two or more
for investment.
Biases tend to be smaller at longer horizons for both output and investment. This tendency
does not carry over to consumption, where the bias continues to be substantial even ﬁve years
after the tax news arrives. This diﬀerence is explained in the next section.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 24
































































Figure 5. Nondurable Consumption Multipliers: True Value (∗) and Econo-
metrician’s Estimate (+). Anticipated increase in capital taxes using informa-
tion ﬂows implied by policy rule (25).
The ﬁgures also make clear that biases can be of any sign. Even when news of a future
rise in capital tax rates actually reduces output in the short run, there are information ﬂows
that rationalize a diverse set of econometric inferences: the one-year estimated multiplier
could range from $1 to −$5. Figures 2aa n d3a show that the simple analytical model can
produce the range of inferences of anticipated tax eﬀects that appears in empirical work.
Figures 4-6 make the analogous point in a calibrated DSGE model drawn from the class of
models in use for policy analysis.
5.2.5. Robustness to Internal Propagation. It is important to understand how aspects of
the model (e.g., parameters or assumptions) alter the eﬀects of foresight. The internal
propagation mechanisms built into many macroeconomic models are introduced to better
match important empirical characteristics. For example, investment adjustment costs are
introduced to elongate impulse response functions so that investmentshocks have a smoother,
more persistent eﬀect on economic activity. Figure 7 demonstrates the response of investment
to a tax shock as the investment adjustment cost parameter changes from 0.5t o0 . T h e
dotted-dashed lines are the true responses of investment to news of a higher capital taxFISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 25
































































Figure 6. InvestmentMultipliers: True Value (∗) and Econometrician’s Esti-
mate (+). Anticipatedincrease in capital taxes using information ﬂows implied
by policy rule (25).
rate, while the solid lines are the means of the econometrician’s estimated responses and the
dotted lines are 95% error bands.24
With investment adjustment costs turned oﬀ (ﬁgure 7b), the reaction at the quarter of
foresight, period four, is abrupt while the periods leading up to the quarter of foresight
are relatively unresponsive. With high adjustment costs (0.5), the model penalizes rapid
adjustments to investment and the agent slowly reduces investment in the periods before
the quarter of foresight. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, introducing frictions into the model
implies that the econometrician will not only misspecify short-run dynamics but potentially
medium-term dynamics as well.
5.2.6. Eﬀects of Other Shocks. Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd muchevidenceof misspeciﬁcation
of non-foresight shocks in the model. The analytical results of section 4 suggest that the
econometrician will not only draw incorrect inferences regarding the ﬁscal shocks but all
remaining shocks of the estimated VAR will also be misspeciﬁed. To examine this, we
identify the government spending shock and assume agents have no foresight with respect
24Based on 100 simulated data sets of length 245 quarters.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 26










Figure 7a: With Adjustment Costs (γ =0 .5)












Figure 7b: Without Adjustment Costs (γ =0 )
Figure 7. Response of Investment to Higher Anticipated Capital Tax Rate.
True responses (dotted-dashed lines) and means (solid lines) and 95% error
bands (dotted lines) of estimated responses.
to this shock. The true impulse response functions were all very close to the structural VAR
estimates; the lone exception is investment, which falls outside of the 90% error band.
While this suggests that foresight might not impinge on the identiﬁcation of other shocks,
we oﬀer two important caveats. First, in our simulation exercises, we give the econometrician
the exact parameters of the model necessary for identifying the shocks. This is done to
pinpoint the eﬀects of foresight. If instead we were to assume that the econometrician must
estimate these parameters, the results would look much worse. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, many recent papers argue that foresight should be extended in many directions
[e.g., Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)]. Indeed, Ramey (2007) argues forcefully that agents
will have knowledge of a government spending shock long before it hits the economy. There
is no doubt that the introduction of multiple sources of foresight and, therefore of possible
noninvertibility, will dramatically magnify the size of the error for all shocks.
6. Concluding Remarks: Attacking the Problem
We have explicitly shown how ﬁscal foresight introduces econometric diﬃculties that com-
plicate the interpretation of conventional econometric analyses. The crux of the issue is that
foresight, of any type, can introduce nonfundamental moving average representations into
the linear equilibrium process. This implies that the mapping between the true tax news
that agents observe and the “tax shocks” that the econometrician identiﬁes can be vastly
diﬀerent. Many of the econometric techniques in macroeconomists’ toolboxes—impulse re-
sponse functions, variance decompositions, Granger-causality tests, tests of cross-equation
restrictions—can be distorted by empirical methods that do not adequately estimate the
non-invertible moving average components of equilibrium time series. Section 5 demon-
strates that foresight is quantitatively important in the class of models now in wide use for
macro policy analysis.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 27
Using theory to understand the econometric problems associated with ﬁscal foresight is a
necessary ﬁrst step toward developing econometric techniques to correct for potential non-
invertibility problems. The macroeconomic literature does not take a theoretical approach
to identify the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight; that empirical work has also produced a wide range
of results. This paper explains the wide range of inferences as stemming from confronting
the econometric work with alternative assumptions about the ﬂow of information about tax
changes.
Two lines of attack appear in the empirical macro literature. The ﬁrst estimates con-
ventional VARs, identiﬁed in a variety of creative ways to isolate “anticipated taxes,” and
then examines the impacts of ﬁscal foresight ex-post [Sims (1988), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Yang (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2008)]. A second line rejects VAR identiﬁca-
tion schemes ex-ante, arguing that they cannot adequately measure the impacts of foreseen
changes in ﬁscal policy, and takes a diﬀerent—narrative—approach to identiﬁcation that
brings fresh data to bear on the problem [Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichen-
baum, and Fisher (1999), Ramey (2007), Romer and Romer (2007a), Mertens and Ravn
(2008)]. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, no consensus about the impacts of anticipated tax
changes has emerged from either line of attack.
The explicit analytical characterization of ﬁscal foresight that we present allows one to
understand these diverse approaches within a single framework: both the ex-post and ex-
ante approaches share the aim of ﬁnding instrumental variables for news about future tax
changes. Returning to the simple model of section 3, the equilibriumrepresentation of capital
is invertible in current and future capital, implying that a good instrument for the tax news
that arrives at t would be highly correlated with a particular weighted average of current
and future capital:25
kt =( α
−1 + θ)kt+1 − θ(α
−1 + θ)kt+2 + θ
2(α
−1 + θ)kt+3 −···+ α
−1κετ,t. (32)
In Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008)w ea n a l y z et h ee ﬃ c a c yo ft h eex-ante and ex-post
approaches. We provide conditions under which each approach deliversas a valid instrument.
We argue that the diverse results can largely be attributed to the quality of the instrumental
variable. Performance quality depends entirely on auxiliary assumptions about, for example,
information ﬂows and tax policy behavior. Both the ex-ante and ex-post approaches help to
alleviate the informational discrepancy between the agent and the econometrician, but they
do not obviate the need to confront the diﬃcult issues associated with modeling information
ﬂows and identifyingexogenous ﬁscal actions. As our results in the previous section highlight,
slight deviations in information ﬂows can dramatically alter conclusions about ﬁscal policy
behavior.
A third, lessmacro-oriented, empiricalapproach is associated with Poterba (1989), Fortune
(1996), and Park (1997). Those papers exploit the diﬀerential tax treatment of municipal
bonds and other bonds, such as treasury and corporate securities, to identify innovations in
yield spreads with news about tax policy changes. When markets are eﬃcient, asset prices
reﬂect all information currently available to market participants, especially news concerning
the future paths of relevant variables. Because asset pricesreact quicklyto news, conditioning
on asset prices should alleviate the discrepancy between the agents’ and the econometrician’s
25Although the simple mapping (32) emerges from this stylized example, any given theoretical model will
yield an analogous mapping that produces an object with which a good instrument should be correlated.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 28
information sets. This hypothesis led Beaudry and Portier (2006) to include stock prices
in a VAR in order to capture agents’ expectations about future changes in productivity.
Asset price movements are notoriously diﬃcult to interpret. It is hard to disentangle the
movement in asset prices associated with news from other sources of variation (e.g., changes
in risk premia).26 Ideally, the asset could be decomposed along some measurable dimension
to identify changes in news. Consider the case of ﬁscal foresight and municipal bonds. If
Rm is the yield on a municipal bond and R the yield on a taxable bond, then an “implicit
tax rate” can be calculated as τ =1− Rm/R, assuming the bonds have the same term to
maturity and credit risk. This is the tax rate at which the investor is indiﬀerent between the
tax-exempt and taxable bonds. If participants in the municipal bond market are forward
looking, the implicit tax rate should predict subsequent movements in individual tax rates.
Several papers document the ability of the municipal bond market to forecast changes in
ﬁscal policy [Poterba (1989), Fortune (1996), Park (1997)].
Finally, it is straightforward to use standard methods, such as An and Schorfheide (2007),
to estimate a model with foresight. This is the approach taken in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2008), who make very particular assumptions about the information ﬂows that give rise
to foresight about technology and government spending. The tradeoﬀ is that the modeler
must be explicit about the role of information in the economy. As table 1 and ﬁgures
4-6 document, diﬀerent assumptions about information ﬂows can dramatically alter the
dynamics of the model and the associated econometric inferences. Robust results may emerge
from making the distribution of information more ﬂexible. A tricky aspect of this endeavor
is that misspeciﬁcation of information ﬂows is likely to get confounded with other types
of misspeciﬁcation, which is why it is essential to check for robustness of ﬁndings across
speciﬁcations of information ﬂows.
This paper is the ﬁrst to document theoretically the important empirical implications gen-
erated by foresight. Future research will focus on developing the theoretical and econometric
techniquesnecessary to handle the issues implied by the analytical framework examined here.
Progress in identifying the dynamic impacts of tax changes calls for a fresh perspective on
the problem that carefully models the information ﬂows that underlie ﬁscal foresight.
26This identiﬁcation is less problematic for tax foresight than it is in Beaudry and Portier’s (2006)e n v i r o n -
ment. News about technology amounts to a latent variable that provides information about an unobservable;
news about taxes, on the other hand, is a latent variable informing about a measurable object—tax rates or
revenues.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 29
Appendix A. A Model with Real Rigidities
A.1. The Model Economy. The economy includes several features commonly added to
real business cycle (RBC) models to improve their ﬁt to data. Basic RBC models, while
capable of producing comparable moments of many key macroeconomic variables [Prescott
(1986)a n dKing and Rebelo (1999)], rely heavily on technology shocks to generate ﬂuctua-
tions in aggregate economic activity. The literature, however, cannot identify a large single
shock that is as quantitatively important as implied by the model [Cochrane (1994)]. Fea-
tures such as variable factor utilization rates and durable goods consumption are designed
to enhance the propagation mechanisms of the RBC model [Bils and Cho (1994)a n d?]. In
addition, models without frictions adjustment too quickly to innovations, inconsistent with
empirical ﬁndings. Features such as habit formation, deliberation costs, and investment
adjustment costs are intended to capture the sluggish responses found in estimates VARs
[Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004)].
A.1.1. Preferences. A representativehousehold derivesutilityfromthree sources: nondurable
goods consumption (Ct), durable goods consumption (Dt), and leisure (1 − Lt). It incurs




























Consumption enters the utility function in the form of C∗
t ≡ Ct − bCt−1,w h e r eb ≥ 0,
indicating the degree of habit formation. τ and σ are the elasticities of intertemporal and
intratemporal substitution in consumption. θ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal












Dt−1 (ϕ>0) captures disutility
from changing the durable stock, often interpreted as deliberation costs.






subject to the budget constraint






WtLt +( 1− τ
K
t )rtutKt−1 +( 1− δD)Dt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt,
and the law of motion for capital
Kt =( 1− δt)Kt−1 − Ω(It,I t−1). (33)
ξt is an i.i.d. shock to the rate of discount, with ξt = ξeε
ξ
t. Bt is government debt issued at
time t, which pays RtBt units of goods at t+1. It is gross investment, including investment
adjustment costs. As in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), we assume the net







× It,w h e r eΓ( 1 )=Γ   (1) = 0 and Γ  (1) ≡
γ>0.27 τL
t and τK
t are marginal labor and capital income tax rates, and Tt is lump-sum
27The method of solution does not require the speciﬁcation of Γ(·), only γ.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 30
transfers. Wt is the wage rate for labor. Finally, ut is the capital utilization rate and rt is
the rental rate for one eﬀective unit of capital, utKt−1.
We assume a constant depreciation rate for durables, δD, but not for capital. As in ?,
using capital more intensively makes capital depreciate at a faster rate. The depreciation




where 0 <δ<1a n dω>1.
A.1.2. Production. A representative ﬁrm rents capital and labor from households to maxi-
mize proﬁt
Yt − WtLt − rtutKt−1. (35)





Technology, At, evolves according to
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + ε
A
t . (37)
A.1.3. Government. Governmenteach period sells one-period bonds and collecttax revenues
to pay for its expenditures on government consumption (Gt) and transfers and to service its
debt obligations Rt−1Bt−1. The government’s budget constraint at each date is
Bt = Gt + Rt−1Bt−1 − τ
L
t WtLt − τ
K
t rtutKt−1 + Tt. (38)
To maintain budget solvency, ﬁscal variables adjust in response to changes of government
indebtedness, as measured by deviations of the debt-output ratio (sB
t ≡ Bt
Yt ) from its steady







t = ρTˆ s
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where 0 <ρ T < 1, qT ≤ 0,ε T
t is an i.i.d. transfer shock, and εT
t ∼ N(0,σ2
T)






t = ρGˆ s
G





where 0 <ρ G < 1, qG ≤ 0, εG
t is an i.i.d. government spending shock, and εG
t ∼ N(0,σ2
G)
Labor and capital tax rates are speciﬁed in (25).
A.2. Benchmark Calibration. The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Table 2
summarizes the benchmark calibration. The benchmark calibration assumes four quarters
of foresight (φ4 = 1) and implies a steady state nondurable consumption-output ratio of
0.60, durable expenditures-output ratio of 0.09, investment-output ratio of 0.12, government
consumption-output ratio of 0.20, and debt-output ratio of 0.44. The corresponding averageFISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 31
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
α. 36 τL .2 ξ 1
β. 99 τK .39 ω 1.9
θ 1 sT .064 γ. 3
δ. 02 sG .2 τ. 6
δD .025 qT −.02 σ 1.05
ρT,ρ G,ρ K,ρL .9 qG −.02 σG .015
ρA .95 qK,q L .01 σA .007
μK 1 ϕ 4 σK,σ L .02
μL .2 b. 5 σξ,σ χ,σ T .005
Table 2. Benchmark calibration.
Relative s.d. in % Correl. with output 1st-order AR
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Output 1111 .74 .84
Nondurables .39 .47 .84 .78 .81 .78
Durables 3.13 3.09 .80 .58 .43 .72
Investment 5.74 4.79 .83 .83 .88 .78
Labor .75 .88 .36 .87 .69 .91
Govt Spending 2.51 2.14 .06 .17 .74 .90
Capital Tax Rev. 3.64 3.11 .41 .54 .78 .83
Labor Tax Rev. 2.71 3.53 .18 .78 .68 .78
Table 3. Business cycle statistics for the model and the U.S. Economy,
1947:1Q-2008:2Q: relative standard deviations are in percent; 1st-order AR
is the autoregressive coeﬃcient for each series.
ratios in the U.S. data from 1947:1Q to 2008:2Q are 0.56, 0.08, 0.16, 0.20, and 0.42, respec-
tively.28 Other statistics, based on 1000 simulations, are summarized in table 3.F o re a c h
variable of interest, the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter is applied to simulated data in logarithm. For
each series, we compute standard deviations in percent normalized by the standard deviation
of output, contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients with output, and the coeﬃcient of the
ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. The model produces business cycle moments comparable
to the postwar U.S. data for most variables examined here.
29
One caveat is that the model generates much weaker positive correlation between output
and labor than the empirical counterpart. Two main factors dampen the correlation between
output and labor. First, the automatic stabilizer built in the labor income tax rule raises the
labor income tax rate when output rises, which suppresses the positive response of labor to
a shock that increases output. Second, in response to a technology shock, the current model
28The debt-output ratio is based on the average ratio of federal debt held by the public as computed in
table B-79 of Economic Report of the President (2008), from 1947 to 2007.
29The data counterpart is taken as aggregate hours of wage and salary workers on nonfarm payrolls by
sector, availableat ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/opt/tableb10.txt. Data counterpart of government
spending is government consumption and investment of all levels of government. Capital and labor income
tax revenues are constructed based on Jones’s (2002) deﬁnitions.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 32
with real rigidities such as habit formation and investment adjustment costs suppress the
quick movement in labor and dampens the positive contemporaneous correlation between
output and labor.FISCAL FORESIGHT AND INFORMATION FLOWS 33
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